Abstract：With the continuous promotion of the "double carbon" strategy，the reformation of China's

electricity market has entered a new stage，but the overall construction of the electricity market is still in the

primary stage，and there is an urgent need to develop a scientific and feasible regulatory prevention strategy. An

iterative model of "evolution game—optimized clearing" was established between regulators and risky subjects. A

library of market risk and profit indicators was formed. And the risk prevention strategy was quantitatively

constructed for the electricity market. The evolutionary stabilization strategy and market risk changes in the process

of continuous game interaction between the two participants was explored. Iterative simulations base on real data，

the simulation results show that when the market risk is high，after limited rounds of evolutionary game，the

regulatory prevention strategy can reduce the degree of transaction risk，which verifies the effectiveness of the

regulatory prevention strategy. The proposed method can provide theoretical support for the formulation of

electricity market regulatory strategy.

      Key words：power market risk；quantitative regulatory prevention strategy；evolution game；optimal market

clearing